Does knowledge about antipoverty programs spread quickly within poor communities or are there significant frictions, such as due to social exclusion? We combine longitudinal and intra-household observations in estimating the direct knowledge gain from watching an information movie in rural India, while randomized village assignment identifies knowledge sharing with those in treatment villages who did not watch the movie. Knowledge is found to be shared within villages, but less so among illiterate and lower caste individuals, especially when also poor; these groups relied more on actually seeing the movie. Sizable biases are evident in impact estimators that ignore knowledge spillovers. 
Introduction
The literature on antipoverty programs has often stressed the informational constraints facing policy makers in reliably knowing who is eligible. However, another information problem looms large: that facing potential beneficiaries of such programs. The spread of information about development programs within communities is one factor relevant to the success of those programs. If information disperses quickly then the program will be better able to function, including in recruiting eligible participants. If there are significant frictions to knowledge diffusion-such as due to weak communication links or strategic behavior in whether or how information is conveyed-then the program will work less well, and (in extreme cases) local development efforts may be stalled. There is some supportive evidence from various settings for the view that lack of information is a decisive factor inhibiting successful action by poor people to influence local decision making processes and access the services to which they are entitled.
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Recognizing this concern, information campaigns are often used by public authorities and nongovernmental organizations in conjunction with their main program.
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This paper uses an information campaign to identify key aspects of how knowledge is shared within communities, as one element in understanding program efficacy. The paper's premise is that knowledge diffusion about public programs is not an automatic and socially neutral activity but an integral part of the same social and economic processes that perpetuate poverty and inequality. There are foundations for this premise in the literature. It has often been argued that poor minority groups are disadvantaged in the labor market due to their lack of information on job opportunities and weak connections to sources of better information. 4 Economic models have been proposed to explain how this situation can persist, even when efforts are made to equalize opportunities (Loury, 1977) . Sociological writings have often emphasized lack of access to knowledge about social programs in creating and maintaining social exclusion (see, for example, Tilly, 2007) .
These issues are relevant to how knowledge about public programs spreads in rural India.
The density of a typical village gives ample scope for people to meet and talk about what they have learnt about some new public program. However, social frictions to knowledge diffusion are also likely. Anecdotal observations suggest that knowledge about an initiative coming from outside the village is often controlled by the local elites (who are typically the first contact point in the village) and that they tend to spread knowledge through filters consistent with their own interests. Widespread illiteracy in poor areas supports this selective learning process. In rural India, caste creates special frictions in social interaction and (hence) information diffusion, especially in rural areas. Dalits (also called Scheduled Castes) have faced a long history of discrimination and exclusion; for example, in the majority of Indian villages today, Dalits are not allowed to share food with non-Dalits. 5 It is rare for lower and upper caste families to be close neighbors within the village, and the "Dalit only" area of the village is typically quite well defined and known to all, with strong social pressures (including possible violence) when lower caste people step too far into the domains of other caste groups. The degree of social and political connectivity in this context is greater for more advantaged castes (see, for example, Desai et al., 2010 ).
In such a setting, knowledge about a new antipoverty program may diffuse rather poorly by word-of-mouth, especially if the information enters via the local elite. Unless a poor, lowercaste, individual comes into direct contact with the source of new information she may come to know little about a program intended to help people like her. Strategic behavior may even act to worsen the information flow. For example, if the program has potentially adverse impacts for the village elite, who are better connected to knowledge sources than the poor, then misinformation may be spread for strategic reasons. Similarly, eligible participants who anticipate rationing of the opportunities announced in an information campaign may rationally choose not to spread the word. Holding a public meeting as part of the campaign might well do a better job of knowledge diffusion than (say) an official letter to the village leader, but it remains unclear just how effective this will be, also noting that socially non-neutral selection processes are likely to be at work in terms of who attends such a meeting and who influences its agenda and discussions; preexisting inequalities are unlikely to vanish in such a public meeting (Heller and Rao, 2015) . 5 A graphic account of the treatment of Dalits in much of rural India can be found in Human Rights Watch (2007) .
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These observations beg a number of questions: Does information about a public program in rural India spread reliably beyond those who learn about it directly? Does it flow more easily among some groups than others? In particular, are the poor within the village sufficiently well connected socially to tap into the flow of knowledge, or does poverty come with social exclusion, including exclusion from information about programs designed to help poor people?
As this paper shows, an information campaign can throw light on the extent to which information is shared within villages, and so address these questions. The campaign studied here used an entertaining fictional movie to teach people their rights under India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). NREGA created a justiciable "right-to-work" for all rural households in India. The most direct and obvious way NREGA tries to reduce poverty is by providing extra employment in rural areas on demand. This requires an explicit effort to empower poor people, who are encouraged to take deliberate unilateral actions to demand work on the scheme from local officials. The stipulated wage rate for the scheme is often above the local market wage rate for similar work. Naturally, such a program is seen as a potential threat to the landholding elites in traditional (primarily agricultural) villages; in particular, if the program worked well then it would put upward pressure on local wage rates, reducing the profits of those with larger landholdings.
The setting for this study is rural Bihar-a relatively poor state of about 100 million people in the Northeast of India. In previous research, it was found that most men and threequarters of women had heard about NREGA, but most were unaware of their precise rights and entitlements under the scheme (Dutta et al., 2014) . With the aim of promoting better knowledge about NREGA in this setting, the movie was randomly assigned to sampled villages, with a control group not receiving the movie. Knowledge about NREGA was assessed in both treatment and control villages. Residents were encouraged to watch the movie, but not (of course) compelled to do so. Some watched it and some did not. A previous paper studied the "intent-totreat" impacts of the movie on knowledge, perceptions and outcomes for program participation (Ravallion et al., 2015) . The present paper goes more deeply into the impacts on knowledge, and the channel of that impact-notably whether it was purely through the direct effect of watching the movie or whether it was through knowledge sharing within villages.
The main methodological challenge is how to identify the knowledge gains (if any) for those in the assigned villages who did not actually watch the movie. Such spillover effects are 5 known to be a source of bias in evaluations of public programs given that one of the key assumptions made in classic evaluation methods is that the comparison group used to infer the counterfactual is not also impacted by the program. 6 As a general proposition, biases can be anticipated for certain impact estimators when this assumption fails to hold. A specific instance is relevant to the evaluation of geographically assigned programs, as studied in this paper. Here the concern is not spillover effects between areas but within them. Many social programs take the form of an individually-assigned intervention (such as a health program, a transfer payment or access to credit). Some people within well-defined geographic areas take up the program and some do not. In evaluating such programs, a seemingly attractive option is to randomly assign access to the program across geographic areas. Take up within areas is endogenous but the randomized assignment across areas can be used as the instrumental variable (IV). Spillover effects are an obvious threat to the validity of this approach and there are various examples in the literature. 7 To the extent that those within an assigned area who do not directly participate in the program are affected (positively or negatively), the exclusion restriction required by the IV estimator will not hold and the estimates will be biased. If the investigator can do a double randomization then the problem can be avoided (Baird et al., 2014) .
Methodologically, the paper proposes a solution to the problem of distinguishing the direct effect from the spillover effect through knowledge sharing when double randomization is not a feasible option. 8 We postulate that there is a latent process of knowledge diffusion among households within the village. An individual's knowledge reflects both this process and a latent individual effect representing the individual's "connectedness." The latter is assumed to be time invariant, as it depends on long-standing networks of association between people, reflecting how each individual fits within the village social structure including caste positions and the ability of that individual to process the new information.
The essential idea is to combine a specific double difference method to estimate the direct impact (allowing for endogenous take up), with randomized assignment across villages, which 6 then identifies the spillover effect. For the purpose of identifying the direct effect, the survey design combined a standard T=2 panel structure with two separate adult interviews to collect data on personal knowledge about NREGA. Having two observations within each household allows us to obtain an estimate that is robust to latent heterogeneity in household factors, similarly to the sibling-difference estimator that has been used in the literature to eliminate a confounding household effect in studying outcomes for children. 9 By exploiting the differences over time, our non-experimental estimator is also robust to time varying individual effects, such as latent social connectivity within the village.
The paper finds evidence of spillover effects, which account for about one third of the average impact of the information campaign. While knowledge sharing is evident, poorer people, by various criteria, appear to be less well connected, and so benefit less from the spillover effect-relying more on direct exposure to the intervention. Methodologically, we find that there is a substantial bias in the IV estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated due to a failure of the exclusion restriction, stemming from knowledge spillovers.
The following section describes the setting and data. Section 3 outlines the proposed econometric method. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
The setting and data
Bihar is one of the poorest two or three of India's larger states. Based on official Planning
Commission poverty lines for 2009/10, 55% of its rural population of 90 million lived below the poverty line. Although one would hope that NREGA worked well in India's poorest states (where it is presumably needed most), Bihar has one of the lowest participation rates of any state (Dutta et al., 2014) . The scheme that implements NREGA in Bihar is the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS).
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The survey data: The data were collected explicitly for the purpose of evaluating the scheme's performance, as documented in Dutta et al. (2014 Our estimation method (discussed in detail in Section 3) requires that we focus on the subsample of panel households in which two members were interviewed in both rounds. This "2x2" subsample has 2,376 individuals. The fact that we exclude households for which only one adult was available for interview suggests the possibility of sample-selection bias. The 2x2 subsample differs from the full sample in some respects. For example, the two-adult panel is more likely to be male headed, less likely to have a widowed respondent, and more likely to be a larger household. 13 We test whether the sample selection affects our results for those evaluation parameters that do not require the balanced panel, which gives a sample of 4,792 individuals.
It is of interest to test for heterogeneity in the direct and spillover effects in the R1 data, though recognizing that stratification comes with a loss of power. In one case we stratify by three groups of households defined by actual or desired BREGS participation in R1, before the information campaign. First, there are the actual participants in BREGS. Second, we identify a group of "excess demanders," defined as those who said they wanted BREGS work but did not get it; past research has indicated substantial un-met demand for work on the scheme (Dutta et 8 al., 2014) . The remainder forms the third group, identified as those who were not interested in participating. We expect the information intervention (discussed further below) to have more impact on the second group, since they express a desire to participate-which presumably motivates learning-but are not participating.
We also stratify by four socioeconomic indicators: caste, literacy, landlessness and consumption poverty. Two caste groups are distinguished; the first is the less advantaged group-the Scheduled Castes comprising Dalits and Mahadalits (a local Bihar category, recognized by the state government). The second is mainly Other Backward Castes and the general caste group (not one of the commonly identified poorer caste/tribal groups).
"Landlessness" is defined as owning no cultivatable land. "Poverty" is identified by a household consumption per person below the R1 median (which closely accords with the official poverty measure for Bihar). The sample is clearly not evenly spread across the combinations of these dimensions, as can be seen from Table 1 , which gives the number of sample points in each cell combination. Of those who are both in the lower caste grouping and consumption poor, 86% are landless, and in 57% of cases both persons are also illiterate. Among those who are in our upper caste grouping and not consumption poor, we find that in 41% of cases at least one of the two persons is literate and the household has some land. But the associations are far from perfect; for example, the instances of both adults being illiterate are similar for the two caste groups. Also note that the counts for some cells are quite low, raising the need for caution about inferences for these cells.
Knowledge:
In both R1 and R2, the respondents were asked whether they had heard of NREGA and, if so, they were asked 12 questions testing their knowledge of the scheme's functioning and their rights. We call this the NREGA quiz. This was administered separately to one male and one female member of each sampled household when feasible.
As an overall measure of knowledge about the scheme's employment aspects we calculate an "employment knowledge index" as the number of correct answers to the eight employment and wage related questions in the NREGA quiz. The average scores on employment knowledge in R1 is 2.6 for men and 1.5 for women (out of a maximum of 8).
A second measure can be created for knowledge of the facilities and amenities that the scheme mandates must be provided at work sites (daycare, drinking water, shade and first aid kits). Respondents were asked to identify what facilities were supposed to be provided. We call 9 this the "facilities knowledge index." The mean number of correct answers on the facilities test in R1 was 1.4 and 1.0 for men and women respectively out of a maximum of 4. Clearly knowledge about these aspects of the program is deficient. However, there can be little doubt that knowledge about employment and wages is more important to the lives of poor people in this setting than knowledge about facilities.
It is not easy to do interviews of individuals on their own in this setting. So some crosseffect can be expected. Nonetheless, the scores generally differed between the two respondents, which motivates our identification strategy. In R1, the scores on the employment quiz differed in 68% of cases, though falling to 44% for the facilities knowledge index; Table 2 gives the frequency distribution of the difference in scores. It is clear that the spread is quite large. So there is ample scope for explaining the differences within households in terms of whether the respondent watched the movie, though this is less so for knowledge about facilities than for employment and wages. Table 3 gives the breakdown of mean scores on our knowledge tests between the three groups. Participants scored better than either excess demanders or others. Participants may well have learnt by participating, so one cannot conclude from Table 3 that knowledge was the cause of participation. We also see from Table 3 that the participants and excess demanders are more likely to be illiterate and to have completed less schooling. There is an association with caste;
participants are more likely to be Mahadalits, and the third group (neither participants nor excess demanders) are more likely to be general caste members. There are also signs that BREGS participants tend to have better political connections, as indicated by responses to survey questions on whether the respondent was "close to" each of a series of designated local officials.
The information campaign:
The majority of adults are illiterate, so a movie in the local language makes sense as an information tool. Dutta et al. (2014) report pilot tests of alternatives, such as reading a summary of NREGA provisions in gender-specific focal groups, which did not show much promise. But a pilot film (based on TV advertisements for NREGA) did show promise, judged by audience reaction and subsequent discussion in focal groups.
14 So a 20 minute movie was produced to explicitly convey information about rights and entitlements under BREGS. 15 The movie was tailored to Bihar's specific context and program guidelines. Professional actors performed in an entertaining and emotionally engaging storybased plot whose purpose was to provide information on how the scheme works, who can participate and how to go about participating. The movie stresses the fact that all adults are eligible for the scheme and that potential workers need to demand work in order to get it, in addition to providing information on guidelines for time-bound responses from the government on providing work or an unemployment allowance, and for paying wages.
The story line is centered on a temporary migrant worker returning to his village from the city to see his wife and baby daughter. He learns that there is BREGS work available in the village, even though it is the lean season, so he can stay there with his family and friends rather than return to the city to find work. It was intended that the audience would identify strongly with the central characters. While the lead actor is a man, and the main focus is on him throughout, the story line includes a deliberate flow of supporting actors, including women who indicated that the scheme is open to women who are supposed to receive the same wages as me for equal work.
The information campaign was conducted in February-March 2010 in 40 villages randomly selected from the baseline sample of 150 villages. Compliance at the village level was complete. The intervention was done 2-4 months prior to the follow-up survey (R2), so that information had a reasonable time to spread within the treated villages. Given the timing of the seasons and the nature of the program, the expectation was that if the intervention had impact it should be evident within this time period, given that this coincided with the lean season, when demand for BREGS should be high. Around the time that many people would be in need of extra work, the intervention tells them how to go about getting that work. It is also a season in which forgone income from watching the movie is likely to be relatively low.
Double randomization was not feasible. In some settings one could imagine randomly assigning tickets for seeing the movie. However, that was not considered a reasonable approach in this context. There would be (justifiable) concerns within a treatment village about why some people got a ticket and some did not. There was no plausible reason for rationing, such as due to budget or capacity constraints. And most villages lack a venue that allows exclusion based on not having a ticket.
The treatment and control samples are well balanced. The differences in sample means of the village variables used in the analysis (including village means of household and individual variables) are only statistically significant at the 5% level for three variables out of the 70 tested;
Ravallion et al. (2015) provides details.
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There was negligible spillover effect on the control villages; only 12 households (0.4%) in the R2 sample from control villages reported that they were aware that a film on BREGS had been shown elsewhere. However, spillover effects within the treatment villages are likely.
The movie was shown in two separate locations in each treatment village over one or two days. Typically, it was projected in common areas, such as an open ground, school building, or community hall. The screenings were in an open space about half the time; school buildings were the venue for about half the remainder. At each location, the film was screened twice, followed by a question and answer session and distribution of one-page flyers that pictorially illustrated the main entitlements and processes under NREGA. On arriving in each village, efforts were made to announce and advertise the upcoming screenings in advance. Local officials such as the Mukhiya and Sarpanch, opposition leaders and local BREGS officials were invited to attend.
The movie was a big event in the treatment villages. On average, about 365 people attended either screening, roughly evenly split between the two screenings. About two-thirds of those attending were men. Only in 11% of the showings did people say that the information provided was not new. The average discussion time after the movie was 38 minutes and the movie was deemed by the facilitators to have generated a "lot of discussion" in 29% of the showings. Based on our survey, 86% of men and 77% of women in the treatment villages were aware that the movie had been shown. 55% of men in the sample had actually seen the movie, as compared to 43% of women. 27% of men and 33% of women had not seen the movie but reported that they had discussed it with others in the village. Combining these observations we postulate a knowledge production function of the form:
Notice that vt M appears here to reflect knowledge spillovers, i.e., knowledge gains for someone who lives in a village where the movie was shown, but did not necessarily watch the movie. Our task is to estimate a linearized version of equation (1). We treat i δ and jvt η as unobserved, although we will use the stratifications described in the last section when studying the 13 heterogeneity in the impact of the movie on knowledge; specifically we will study whether the knowledge effects of ijvt m and vt M vary with certain observable dimensions of i δ and jvt η .
Consider any i δ that increases knowledge. How might it alter the impact of the movie on knowledge? The direction of such "cross-effects" is theoretically ambiguous. We might reasonably expect education (say) to enhance knowledge generally and to enhance the impact of a new source of information on knowledge. 17 By contrast, as argued in the introduction, greater social inclusion-more connections within village networks-is likely to enhance knowledge but presumably diminish the knowledge gain from watching the movie; it will be the socially excluded for whom watching the movie will bring the greater gains in knowledge.
Watching the movie is, of course, a matter of personal choice so it is potentially endogenous to knowledge about NREGA. There can be a direct utility gain from watching the movie-its entertainment value-in addition to the benefit from the knowledge gained. (A person may watch the movie solely for its entertainment value.) In deciding whether or not to watch the movie a person weighs the expected benefit against the cost. The expected benefit depends on a set of fixed personal characteristics not all of which are observed. So we can write the utility function as:
δ is low the person will have a higher expected benefit from watching the movie, but a lower level of knowledge about programs such as NREGA. The benefits also depend on the time-varying household and village characteristics. The cost of watching the movie is mainly the opportunity cost of time, which will tend to be lower for the poor, and especially the underemployed poor, who are likely to be interested in NREGA. There can also be idiosyncratic factors that influence the costs of watching the movie (such as the need to attend to a sick family member). For the present purpose, we can think of the cost of watching the movie as including an additive random variable with distribution function ijvt F . The probability of watching the movie is then a function of the utility gain, which depends on vt M , i δ and jvt η , namely:
Later we will use a probit motivated by this model in one of the comparison impact estimators.
Our main task is to estimate the direct and indirect effect of the movie on knowledge, as represented in equation (1). On linearizing the knowledge production function k(.) we have a switching regression for t=2: For t=1, we have:
Given that the movie screenings are randomly assigned across villages it can be assumed that
(for t=1, 2) A key identifying assumption is that the endogeneity of watching the movie stems solely from the two effects, i δ , and jvt η .
Specifically, we assume that (given equation (3)).
Clearly the jvt η effect cannot be eliminated using individual panel data alone. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that we have two observations of individual knowledge within the sampled households, as well as panel data. This feature of the study design was introduced to obtain a consistent estimate of the effect of an individual watching the movie. We can then net this effect out of the data on knowledge and exploit the randomized assignment of vt M to identify the external effect of the movie on knowledge amongst those who need not have seen the movie. Taking the difference over time ( ∆ ) eliminates the individual knowledge effect, but still leaves the time-varying household-village knowledge effect:
(Noting that 1 = 1 = 0.) Taking the difference between the two adults interviewed in each household:
Here ∇ denotes the difference between two adults in the same household. Recalling that it is assumed that ), OLS applied to (7) gives a consistent estimate of β , denoted βˆ. On replacing β by βˆ, equation (7) Given that the movie is randomly assigned, we can then estimate (8) consistently by OLS to obtain 0 α and 1 α , and (hence) identify the knowledge spillover effect.
Notice that the fact that our balanced panel comprises one male and one female in almost all households means that we cannot meaningfully identify the gender difference in the direct impact of watching the movie, though we can test for a gender difference in the spillover effect.
We define the following evaluation parameters based on the above model:
These are standard parameters adapted to the existence of spillover effects. ATET is the impact on knowledge of watching the movie relative to the control villages where the movie was not
shown. This combines the effect of seeing the movie ( ) and living in a village where the movie was shown ( 1 − 0 ). SE is the indirect effect alone-the knowledge spillover. ITT is the usual intent-to-treat parameter.
We will compare our estimates with a number of other approaches found in the literature.
One of these is the OLS regression model motivated by the switching regression in (4). We will do this with and without controls. Another is propensity score matching (PSM), which makes fewer assumptions than OLS-in particular it does not assume a linear parametric model for knowledge. PSM has been used often in estimating ATET and it is proposed by Angelucci and
De Giorgi (2009) as a candidate for estimating spillover effects. We can write the PSM estimators for and as:
where ( 2 ) is the conditional probability for an individual in movie villages to watch the movie as a function of a vector of round 1 individual, household and village characteristics, .) This estimator differs from the naïve OLS with controls but relies on the same assumption that the endogeneity issue can be fully addressed in controlling for observed characteristics. Assuming that part of the decision to watch the movie is actually due to unobserved characteristics a bias will remain in the matching estimate.
Another estimator of interest is:
This is the usual local average treatment effect; in this case, it is equivalent to estimating the average treatment effect of watching the movie using the randomized assignment at village level as the IV. This might help address the endogeneity issue, but it is expected to deliver biased estimates in the presence of knowledge spillovers in movie-villages.
Before implementing our preferred method, we ran a Monte-Carlo simulation to test the identification strategy and the estimation procedure on artificial data for which we know the true values of the parameters of interest. Full details are given in Appendix 1. The results give one confidence that the proposed method is to be preferred when there are both an endogeneity issue and spillovers. Next we apply it to our data.
Results
Column (1) Table 5 gives our preferred estimates for the employment knowledge scores, with βˆ from estimating equation (7) ). 18 About two thirds is the direct effect of watching the movie and one third is indirect, via the intra-village knowledge spillovers.
For comparison, Table 5 gives results for various alternative estimators. Column (2) gives the naïve estimator, using OLS on the switching regression (equation 1). This method incorrectly attributes the impact fully to the direct effect of watching the movie, and substantially overestimates that effect ( 55 . 1 = β ). Column (3) gives the naïve estimate with controls for individual and household characteristics; this is similar to the results for Column (2).
Column (4) gives the PSM estimates. We use a probit to predict the probability of watching the movie, ( ), for all individuals in movie and non-movie villages. In Appendix 3, we report the coefficients of the probit; the estimates reveal some reasonably intuitive selection mechanisms. In Figure 1 we provide the densities of the predicted propensity score in movie and non-movie villages which have a large region of common support. We insure common support by dropping individuals in non-movie villages such that � � < min�( )� for in movie villages, and individuals in movie villages such that ( ) > max �� �� for in non-movie villages. We then match nearest neighbors in term of ( ). We do this by matching one-by-one each individual watching the movie with one counterpart in non-movie villages, and then matching each individual not watching the movie in a movie village with one counterpart in the non-movie villages. We then compute � and � reported in Tables 5 and 8 . The PSM estimates are quite similar to OLS. Neither method accords well with our preferred method.
Column (5) gives the IV estimate of the internal effect ( βˆ) assuming no spillovers, and using the randomized assignment at village level as the IV. This is similarly biased to the OLS estimate. Column (6) gives the ITT estimate.
Recall that we are constrained to using the balanced panel of two individuals per household. To test for sample selection bias, we re-estimated ITT, the naïve OLS, the naïve OLS with controls, the PSM and the IV estimator on the full sample. The detailed results are reported in Appendix 2. The estimates are very similar to those we obtained for the selected subsample of two panel individuals. Now we turn to the stratified results. In Table 6 we stratify the results for βˆ, � 1 − � 0 and ATET ( � 1 − � 0 +̂). First, we give a split by gender. As noted, we cannot differentiate the direct effect by gender given that we rely on having two individuals interviewed in each household, typically one male and one female. We can, however, differentiate the spillover effect. We find that this is almost identical between men and women.
Next, Table 6 gives the results by R1 participation status-namely BREGS participants in R1, excess demanders in R1 (who wanted work on BREGS but did not get it) and the rest. We find that the significant direct effect of watching the movie is confined to the excess demanders, and for them it entails an extra two correct answers to the questions on employment provisions of the scheme. The spillover effect is not, however, found in this group but in the other two. In further calculations (not reported but available on request) we also found that the naïve estimator performs quite well for the excess demanders, capturing 90% of the direct effect of watching the movie on employment knowledge. The IV estimator does less well. However, we found that the naïve estimator performs poorly for the other two groups, substantially overestimating the direct effect, and underestimating the spillover effect. Table 6 gives stratifications by the various poverty indicators. Considering caste first, we find that the direct effect is among the "lower caste" (Mushar/Mahadalit/SC/ST) group, not among the other castes, while the spillover effect is found for the latter. The weaker spillover effect for the lower caste group is consistent with the hypothesis that they are less well connected to the information flows within the village.
Similarly, illiterate, landless and consumption-poor individuals had strong direct effects of watching the movie, but saw far weaker spillover effects. Interestingly ATETs are not very different between the two caste groups. But this hides a marked difference in how much the impact is direct versus indirect.
Given that these poverty dimensions are correlated it is of interest to also see the parameter estimates for the various combinations of characteristics. As we saw in Table 1 , some cell combinations are sparse. Four cells have less than 33 observations, although all the rest have about 100 or more. We dropped the four cells with few observations (one quarter of the combinations)-all of which were lower caste households with land, which is unusual (Table 1) . Table 7 gives the key parameter estimates for each combination of the four poverty dimensions (excluding the four cells with too few observations). The direct effect of watching the movie is especially strong for the consumption poor when they are also of lower caste (by our grouping). The positive spillover effect is especially strong for non-poor upper caste individuals who are not landless; knowledge appears to be shared well within this more advantaged group. A significant negative spillover effect emerges for many of those who are both illiterate and landless. This is suggestive of the presence of strategically placed misinformation for these groups. Table 8 gives the results for the facilities knowledge score (corresponding to Table 5 for employment). Our preferred estimates in Column (1) do not indicate any significant direct or indirect effect of the movie on knowledge about facilities. By contrast the OLS and PSM estimators suggest a significant positive effect of watching the movie, although this vanishes once one addresses the endogeneity using the randomized village assignment as the IV.
When we stratify by the three aforementioned participation groups we again find a significant direct effect for the excess demanders but not others (Table 9) . We find no difference according to caste. Given these results, we do not provide the analogous table to Table 6 for the facilities index. The only notable point was that we found a significant spillover effect on facilities knowledge for poor, lower-caste, landless households when at least one of the two individuals interviewed was literate.
Conclusions
The extent to which information about public programs is shared within villages can matter greatly to access to a program and hence its impact. The paper has proposed a method of identifying such knowledge spillover effects for an individualized treatment when double 20 randomization is not feasible. Differences in learning between individuals within the same household are used to identify the direct impact of the campaign while randomized assignment at village level is used to identify the spillover effect.
We have applied this method to data on the use of an entertaining "information movie" that aimed to teach poor people in rural Bihar their rights under India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. We find that about one third of the average impact on knowledge about the key employment and wage aspects of NREGA was due to the knowledge spilloverthe knowledge gains to people who did not actually watch the movie but lived in a village where it was shown. We find substantial biases in impact estimation methods that ignore spillover effects.
A key finding is that the knowledge diffusion process is far weaker for disadvantaged groups, defined in terms of caste, landholding, literacy or consumption poverty. For poor people, it appears that the direct effect of watching the movie is all that really matters to learning about NREGA. There is also some indication of negative spillover effects for illiterate and landless households, suggesting the spread of misinformation. These results are consistent with the view that poverty persists in part at least through weak social connectivity, leading to limited gains to poor people from knowledge diffusion-including knowledge about public programs intended to help make them less poor. Public information campaigns in this setting need to be targeted to poor groups, rather than relying on existing knowledge diffusion processes within villages. For each of these simulations we did an OLS estimate of the intention to treat effect (ITT), our preferred estimator ( ), the naïve OLS estimate ( ï ), the omniscient OLS estimate where one is able to control for the unobserved source of endogeneity ( ), and the LATE, for a 2SLS IV where the dummy "watched the movie" is instrumented by a randomly assigned dummy variable, "movie shown in the village". These were compared to the true values of , and . For each simulation we ran 500 replications.
The following table gives the results. Simulation 1 indicates that, in the absence of spillover or endogeneity, all strategies give good estimates. Our preferred estimate had a larger standard error, which is to be expected since we are estimating it on a sample of size N/2 (noting that the first stage is a household level regression). From Simulation 2 we found that, in the absence of a spillover effect but with endogeneity, the naïve estimate is biased, while our preferred estimator, the IV and omniscient estimates are all unbiased. With a spillover effect but 25 no endogeneity, the IV estimate is upward biased, while our preferred estimate, the naïve estimate and the omniscient are all unbiased. Finally, Simulation 4 indicates that with a spillover and endogeneity, the IV and naïve estimates are biased, while both our estimate and the omniscient estimate are unbiased. 
20.74%
Note: The Pearlin index is a slightly simplified individual-specific version of the Pearlin Mastery scale, which is a measure of the extent to which individuals perceive themselves to be in control of factors that affect their lives. 
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